Solving the 1980s' Velocity Puzzle: A Progress Report
Courtenay C. Stone and Daniel L. Thornton HE velocity of money measures the relationship between nominal income and the money stock. In its simplest for-m, the quantity theory of money states that nomtiinal income is equal to the money stock multiplied by its velocity. If velocity is reasonably stable, changes in the money stock have predictable consequences on nominal income; if the money stock is controllable as well, the quantity theory has useful imnplications for' economic policy. The relationship between money growth and inflation can he derived from the quantity theory framework by "breaking LII)" nominal income into its two components -the pr-ice level and r'eal output. Thus, the stability of the moneyprice link, holding real output constant, is also related closely to the stability of velocity.
For over' a third of a centtuy -from 1946 to 1981 -the growth of the velocity of money, measured as the ratio of gross national product GNP) to the narrow money stock MU, was stable. Its stability contributed Courtenay C. Stone is a senior economist and Daniel L. Thornton is a research officer at the Federal Reserve Bankot St. Louis. Rosemarie V Mueller provided research assistance. The authors would also like to thank Michael Darby for helpful suggestions on an earlier draft. 'The money stock need not be perfectly controllable; neither, for that matter, must velocity be constant. Movements in velocity (or its growth), however, must be explainable by the behavior of the variables that influence it. This idea, fundamental to macroeconomic policy, was developed by Friedman (1956) . See Thornton (1983) for a discussion of the role of velocity for policy purposes.
to the rise of mnonetarism and the adoption of monetan' aggregate tar-gets by the Federal Reserve and other central banks around the world. Its stability also resulted in two empirically based r'ules of thumb that came to be used fair'ly successfully as guides to money growth's effects on income and inflation. Now, however', analysts believe that these rules have failed to explain the course of income and inflation during the 1980s, due to a relatively sudden and unanticipated drop in velocity.
Given the important role that velocity plays in economic and policy analysis, it is not surprising that considerable effor't has been devoted to solving this velocity puzzle. tinfortunately, these efforts have produced a welter' of competing and occasionally confusing explanations. To bring some or'der to this disarr'av, this article highlights the problemns that have resulted from the puzzling behavior of velocity in recent years and examines the more pronhinent explanations of the velocity puzzle.
Because the concept of velocity stems dir'ectl fr'om the theory of the demand for money, anything that affects velocity can be related to some aspect of the demand for money. See shaded insert on the following page.) Because the demand-for-money approach is likely to be less intuitive to the general reader, however', we will discuss the various explanations of the velocity puzzle in terms of velocity itself.
WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHEN?
'Two fundamental r'elationships between Ml and specific economic measures have been suppom'ted empim'icallv for' decades. One r'elationship is the link between mnoney and GNP, a measur-e of total income in the economy. The second relationship is the link between money and pr'ices. Charts 1 and 2 show the dramatic changes in these relationships that occurred during the 1980s.
Chart 1 depicts the behavior of the income velocity GN P divided by Ni 1 I for the past 40 years; as the chart suggests, something unusual occurred to velocity around 1982. From 1946 through 1981, it rose fairly steadih' at about 3.6 percent pervear; since then, it has declined at an annual rate of about 2.4 percent.
Chart 2 shows Ihe r'elationship since 1948 between annual inflation (as measured by the growth of the GNP deflator') and the average growth in Nil over a three-year' per'iod; use of Ml's trend growth is designed to capture the long-run impact of money on prices. While the rate of inflation deviated from the trend growth of Ml, sometimes substantially, from 1948 to 1981, the deviations generally wer'e ternporan'. More importantly, the lar'ger deviations were attritiutable to non-monetary events for example, governnient mandated wage-price controls, OPEC oil pr'ice actions and the like;. Since 1982, however', inflation has been substantially and per'sistentlv below the trend growth in Ml. 'I'hese deviations are not easily attributable to a specific non-monetai event.
Numerous attempts have been made to explain the r'ecent changes in velocity. In this paper', these explanations are gmnuped loosely into three categor-ies: misspecification, a portmanteau categon' we call ''str-uctural shifts'' and cyclical factors.'
MISSPECIFICATION
The most widely used velocity measure, the income velocity of Ml, is calculated by dividing nominal GNP by the nominal stock of Ml. Both GNP and Nil are empirical counterpar1s to theoretical concepts that appear' in various theories of the demand for money. One explanation for' the shift in velocity is that GNP or '.A number of these are considered in studies by Rasche (1986) , . Hetzel (1987) , Trehan and Walsh (1987) and Kretzmer and Porter (1987) . The categories considered here are somewhat more general than those considered by Trehan and Walsh.
Nil or' tioth have become less reliable pr'oxies for theircor'r'esponding theor'etical concepts. This protilem is called a specification problem
GIVP Vs. Transactions Measures
One specification problem could arise if money is field pr'irnam'ilv to make daily ti'ansactions.' if these include intermediate and financial tr'ansactions. the usual velocity measure could vary with changes in the propor'tion of such transactions relative to transactions on final goods and services. Because GNP measures onl final output, it will differ widely from the level of expenditur'es on all tran.saclrorrs, In this case, GNP is a useful proxy for total tr'ansactions only if the propor'tion of GNP to total tr'ansactions remains relatiyely constant.
This protilem can manifest itself in sever'al ways. F'or' example, suppose consumers purchase mor-e goods and, as a result, imIcr-ease their money holdings in proportion to their incr'eased desire to spend. If these newl purchased goods are impor'ted or' dr'awn from domestic inventories of preyiriusly produced goods, GNP will remain unchanged while the demand for' money rises. Consequentl~the usual measur'e of velocity would decline, while an alternative measure based on total transactions would r'emain unchanged. Thus, using GNti as the transactions measure to calculate velocity may pr-ociuce sizable swings in velocit~' whenever ther'e are large swings in inventories or' net exprir'ts. Some analysts have argued that gr'oss domestic final demand IGDFDI, which equals GNP TTdJIUS inventory adjustments and net exports, is preferable to GNP as the transactions proxy.' t,Jnforftrnately, the substitution of GDFD for-GNP does not explain the velocity ptlzzle of the l980s. As chart 3 indicates, this velocity measure performs essentially the same as the usual mneasur'e both before arid after 1981. Consequently, siriiply replacing GNP with GDFD does not explain the protracted velocity decline dur'ing the l980s."
'See the appendix to Thornton (1983) for an illustration of the specification problem involved in tinding the appropriate measure of "income."
'There are Iwo distinct, though not mutually exclusive theories of the demand for money: the transactions approach and the asset approach. The asset approach emphasizes the role of money as an asset and, hence, as an alternative way of holding wealth. The transactions approach emphasizes the role of money as a medium of exchange. For a useful discussion of this distinction in relation to the velocity issue, see Spindt (1985) . 'Radecki and Wenninger (1985) . 6flasche (1986) also relects this explanation for much the same reason. They too argue that the demand for mone is based on expenditures instead of current income or CNP. in their view, the 1980 tax cut initially increased disposable personal and business income relative to GNP and, hence, raised desired expenditures relatiye to GNP; consequently, the tax cut increased the demand for money, resulting in a fall in velocity.' One way to evaluate this explanation is to look at the ratio of disposable personal income to GNP. if their' explanation is valid, this r-atio should incr'ease when velocity-is falling and decrease when velocity is rising. As char-t 4 indicates, however, this has riot gener-ally happened during the l980s. While there was an initial expansion in disposable income following the tax cut, the ratio of disposable income to GNP has generally declined since 1982.s 'Recently. McGibany and Nourzad (1986) have provided estimates indicating that the demand for money is inversely related to the average tax rate. t Rasche (forthcoming) rejects the tax cut hypothesis by arguing that, for it to explain the velocity decline, marginal tax rates~ouldhave had to have fallen continuously over the 1 980s.
Others have argued that the recent velocity decline is related to a sharp rise in financial transactions r'elative to total output. According to this view, the Iise in financial transactions caused an increase in the demand for-money relative to GNP. One way to assess this claim is to compare velocity measures using broad measures of financial and non-financial transactions in place of GNP? These alternatives ar-c presented in chart 5. The non-financial transactions velocity measur'e shows the same pattern as the GNP velocity measur'e. Consequently, explanations of the velocity puzzle that rely on the recent slowing of GNP growth relative to the growth of more general nonfinancial tr'ansactions measures at-c implausible.
The financial transactions velocity measur'e does not show the downturn in the 1980s that char-acterizes the non-financial and GNP-based velocity measures. Nor', however, does it show substantial incr'eases during the 1980s which would be required if the rse in financial transactions is to account for the decline in Ml velocity. tn fact, the annual growth rate of the financial transactions velocity measure has averaged A somewhat different way to assess whether a tise in financial transactions produced the fall in velocity is shown in chart 6; it compares the movement of velocity with that of the annual ratio of the value of shares sold on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSEI to GNP since 1926." While the ratio of NYSE sales to GNP has risen somewhat during the 1980s, there has been no consistent relationship between this ratio and velocity over the past 60 year's.
GNP Vs. Wealth
Another potential specification problem arises from the use of GNP to calculate velocit instead of using a loll has been argued that the recent decline in velocity can be explained by the rise in stock market transactions, see Morgan Guarantee (1986) .
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rrteasure of ''permanent income'' or u'ealth. The per'-manent incorlie theor of consumer demand suggests that individuals primarily base their consumption decisions on their-permanent incorire or wealth, rather than on cur-rent income. Analogously, the demand for money may' be rnor-e closely related to permanent income or wealth.' Panel A in figure 1 illustrates the theor-elical r-elationship between permanent income arid measured income during cyclical fluctuations. If the demand for monr-w depends upon pet-manent income, it will fluctuate less than will current incorire over the business cycle. Thus, measured velocity will rise (fall) as measured income increases )decreasesr -elative to permanent income because the amount of money held will change less than tneasured income.
Chan't 7 displays both the usual velocity nleasw-e and one based on permanent income estimates." Once again, it does not appear that the velocity decline in the l9SOs is explained by movements in cur--IlFor example, see Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 38) .
"The measure of permanent income used here was suggested by Darby (1972) .
Ratios of GNP/M1 and NYSE/GNP
et~- 3.0 rent relative to permanent income. Although the downtur-ns in the permanent income velocity mneasur'e are less pronounced than those in the current income velocity measure, the general downwat-d shift in velocity during the 1980s shows up clearly in the permanent income v'elocitv measure.
'l'her'e is an explanation consistent with the per-manent income or wealth approach to the demand for money and the observed decline in the income velocits' of money in recent years. Suppose that a rise in per-manent income or wealth relative to current income produced a sharp rise in the demand for money." In this event, depicted in panel B in figure 1, ther'e would be am! associated drop in current income velocity.
Because wealth is the present value of the expected future net income, it will incr'ease either' if expected income increases or the expected real interest rate used to discount futur'e income declines. If ther'e was a rise in expected income withotit a cor-r-esponding increase in measured income during the 198Os, velocity would have fallen as the demand for-money increased relative to GNP. Eventually, mneasur'ed income will rise or expected income will decline as individuals realize that their expectations will be unfulfilled." Consequently, after sufficient time has elapsed, velocity will return to its fornier' path.
If the r-ise in wealth is dire solely to a sharp fall in societ)"s preference for' current relative to future consumption, however, the path of measured income would he unaffected and the level of velocity would be permanently below its former path. This possibility seems unlikely, because it implies a per-nmnent fail in the real interest rate." "Rasche (1986). Santoni (1987) and Kopcke (1986) also consider the wealth explanation. Though their approaches are different, both Rasche and Santoni relect the wealth explanation for the velocity puzzle. Kopcke, on the other hand, finds evidence to support it. His wealth measure, however, includes financial assets that have offsetting liabilities; consequently, at best, it represents a proxy for financial transactions. "Since wealth is the discounted present value of the stream of expected future income, an exogenous increase in wealth relative to current income can result only from a tall in the "real" interest rate or an increase in the expected future income stream. If these latter expectations are correct, measured income will eventually increase, and velocity will eventually return to its long~runlevel as either the nominal money stock expands or the price level falls. If the expectations prove to be wrong, this too will be discovered and velocity will rise subsequently.
"The permanent tall in the real interest rate necessary to explain the fall in velocity is inconsistent with recent estimates of the ex ante real interest rates during the 1980s. See .
Potential Problems with Using Ml
Some have suggested that using Ml as the mono stock measure when calculating velocity causes significant pr'oblems. 't'hev ar-gue that the relevant monetan' measur'e cannot lie obtained simply by adding together' the stocks of var-ious 'monetar' assets cur'-r'ency, checkable deposits, and so on), because each component may pr'ovidie differ'ent quantities of rnonetan' services per unit. Consequently, cr'itics have suggested that an index of the monetary ''services'' provided by the stock of all relevant financial assets is pi-eferable to the use of Ml for evaluating the relationship between money and spending or-pr'ices." If this ci-iticism is valid, changes in ''simple-sum'' monet~u'y aggregates like Ml and M2 may deviate markedly fi'om changes in their underlying monetary services whenever' substantial shifts among various monetary assets occur'. In such cases, the usual measure of velocity may show sizable variations, while those based on the underlying monetary services measures should be relatively stable."
Various monetary services indices )MSI) and the MO, measirr-e have been developed; the)' are cur'r'ently compiled and maintained by the Federal Reserve Board on an experimental basis." The MSI1 measure is an index of the monetary services associated with components of the Ml money stock. The MQ measur-e is an index of all financial assets that can be directly used in transactions; it incorporates the components of Ml plus telephone tr'ansfer's, money market mutual bind balances arid money mar'ket deposit accounts. Chart 8 shows velocity measures based on the MSI1 and MQ." These velocity measur-es show the same general pattern for recent years as the usual Ml velocity measure. Sinular' results hold forliroadermonetary services indices. Consequently, despite their theoretical appeal, substituting monetary service tlows for Ml in measures of velocity does not explain the recent behavior of velocity." "See Batten and Thornton (1985) for a discussion of these issues. "This need not be the case, however, See Milbourne (1986) . "The monetary services indices originally were called Divisia monetary aggregates; they were developed by William Barnett (1980) . The MO measure was developed by Paul Spindt (1985) . The current monetary services indices differ from the original Divisia measures in several respects; see Farm and Johnson (1985) . 
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STRUCTURAL SHIFTS AND THE VELOCITY PUZZLE
Some analysts have suggested that there have been one on' mor'e sttttctural shifts in the money/income r'elationslup. tJnlike the specification pr'ohlems previously discussed, this explanation presumes that the fundamental r'elationship hetween money and income has changed even if the demand for money is correctly specified in terms of Ml and CNP." For a "One structural shift argument not considered explicitly in the text was presented recently byRoley (1985) . He suggested that the velocity puzzle of the 1980s was actually caused by the welldocumented, albeit still unexplained, structural shift in the demand for money that took place in 1974. He argues that the downward shift in velocity in the 1982-83 period is consistent with the behavior of Ml velocity from 1974 through 1981; it is inconsistent, however, with Ml velocity before 1974. Roley's observation does not solve the velocity puzzle-although about 13 years have passed, we still don't know why money demand shifted in the mid-1970s. Furthermore, if his suggestion were valid, the mid-l970s' velocity increase should have been as dramatic as its drop in the 1980s. A glance at chart 1 shows that this is not the case. Moreover, Roley's Ml series was derived from the flow of funds accounts, When conventional money stock and money demand equations are used instead, his results are not confirmed. different structural shift argument, see shaded inser't on the opposite page.
Financial Innovation and Deregulation
Several analysts have suggested that the introduction of NO%'Vs, Super-NOWs and money market deposit accounts )MMDAs) and the removal of regulation Q interest rate ceilings in recent years have pr'oduced a shift in the relationships between Ml and both spending and inflation. In particular, the redefinition of Ml to include interest-bearing checkable deposits (NOWs and Super-NOW5I as well as non-interest-bearing demand deposits and currency is alleged to have altered significantly its "moneyness;" now Ml is presumed to include a significant amount of savings balances," Consequently, changes in Ml resulting from changes in these savings balances are likely to have a smaller "The reader should note the similarity between this and the specification problem. The argument here is that savings balances are now effectively hidden among transactions balances so that a given level of interest-bearing checking account balances effectively can represent different amounts of "transactions money." This is a specifica' tion problem, and results from a fundamental change in the institutional structure. impact on output and prices than previously." Specifically, then'e maybe extended pen-iods when significant incr-eases in Ml produce little or no associated growth in spending or-inflation; on these occasions, velocity would decline substantially." Moreover, if the savings portion of Ml is related to GNP differently than its "From another perspective, the growth rate of old M2 velocity had a trend growth rate of zero; see Ott (1982) . Some have argued that new Ml is close to old M2 -old Ml plus time and savings deposits, so perhaps the trend growth rate of its velocity, too, will be about zero. While the period since 1981 is too short to establish a trend, the growth rate of the new Ml velocity over this period has been about -2.4 percent.
"While the experimental monetary aggregates should reduce or eliminate such problems, this does not seem to be the case. See Batten and Thornton (1985, pp. 32-33) for a discussion of this point.
transaction components, the relationship between the growth n'ates of Ml and GNP may be permanently altered.
These savings balances appear only in the "other checkable deposits" (00)1 component of Ml. Thus, the validity of this explanation can be examined by comparing the behavior of velocity measures using MM (which consists of curnency and non-interesthearing checkable depositsi Or' currency alone with that of the Ml velocity measure during the lYSOs. By increasing the cost of holding currency and demand deposits, the intn-oduction of interest-bearing checkable deposits 1NOWs and Super NOWsI should have induced a relative shift fiom demand deposits and currency into these new accounts; this, in turn, should produce a significant rise in currency and MM velocity measures. Once individuals' portfolios are Velocities of GNP/M1 and GNP/M1A realigned, however, the prior' currency and MM velocity relationships should be restored.
Charts 9 and 10 show the MM-and currencyvelocit measures. The MIA-velocity measure and, to a lesser extent, the cur'rency-velocitv measure rose sharply in the first quarter of 1981 when NOWs were introduced nationwide. Contrary to this structural shift explanation, however', both measures subsequently declined."
Another explanation for the change in Ml velocity is an increased r-esponsiveness of various Ml components to changes in the interest rate. According to this explanation, the financial innovations of the 1980s did not necessarily cause a downward shift in velocity due to a shift of savings balances into transactions accounts; instead, they altpred the sensitivity of Ml balances to interest rates. Since the demand for money is inversely related to the interest rate, a decline in the "This is the basis for Rasche's (1986) rejection of this explanation.
The introduction of these new accounts, however, may have increased the interest elasticity of the demand for the M1A components.
interest r'ate will cause the demand for money to rise relative to GNP and, hence, velocity will decline.
The theoretical basis for this argument stems from basic consumer' demand theory, which argues that the responsiveness of the demand for a commodity to changes in its price increases with the number and closeness of substitute goods. The financial innovations of the 1980s produced new and close substitutes for traditional demand deposit and cur-rency components of Ml. While the interest rate is not the price of money, it represents a significant opportunity cost for holding it. Consequently, the financial innovations of the l980s should have increased the responsiveness of some of the components of Ml to changes in the interest rate, The "other-checkable-deposit" component ofMl bears inter'est, and the interest rate paid on these deposits is now free to change with market rates." Consequently, this component of Ml should be 2 eBusinesses cannot hold interest-bearing checking accounts. See Gilbert and Holland (1984) for a summary of the major innovations and deregulations of the I 980s, Also, the currency component of Ml generally is more closely tied to real income than to interest mate movements, 
Velocities of GNP/M1 and GNP/Currency
relatively unresponsive to interest rate movements. This could be mitigated by the fact that r'ates on these deposits appear to have been slow to adjust to changes in other market interest rates.
This view suggests that the relationship between velocit and interest rates should have strengthened since the financial innovations of the 1980s. Indeed, this pattern is reflected in Chart 11, which shows Ml velocity and the three-month Treasury bill rate. Prior to 1981, velocity appears to be unrelated to movements in the T-bill r'ate. Since 1981, however, the two have similar patterns. This is consistent with a nutnber of studies which report an increased interest sensitivity of Ml balances during the 1980s." (Additional analysis is provided in the appendix.) It remains to be seen whether the apparent change in Ml's interest sensitivity alone can account for the aberrant behavior of Ml velocity.
"For example, Hetzel (1987) , Trehan and Walsh (1987) and Rasche (1986) . Rasche reports mixed results and concludes that this argument needs further study and analysis.
CYCLICAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE VELOCITY PUZZLE
Until now, we have assumed implicitly that the supply of money passively expands to meet society's demand. Another interpretation argues that substantial exogenous changes in the supply ofMl can induce cyclical swings in measured velocity because of their lagged effect on the economy. Forexample, an accelen'-ation in the gr-owth rate of Ml initially may produce a less than proportionate rise in the level of nominal GNP, and, thus, an initial decline in velocity. Eventually, however, when the monetary change has worked its way thr'oughout the economy fully, the longer-run relationship between Ml growth and the rate of spending is reestablished, and velocity returns to its long-run path.
This analysis can explain a continuous fall in velocity relative to its underlying trend only if Ml growth is continuously accelerating. The "ever-and-ever-faster Ml growth" explanation for the velocity decline in the 
Expected Inflation and Velocity
Another explanation is that velocity's recent behavior results from changes in the public's expectations of inflation. According to this view, the demand for money is inversely related to the expected rate of eThere is a 4 percentage point spread between peak trend-MI growth in the 1980s and the late 1 970s. Hence, even if there were no nominal output response to the more rapid Ml growth overthe entire period, the acceleration in Ml growth, at most, could account for a 4 percentage point decline in trend velocity growth; that is, from about 3 percent to about -I percent. In addition, this explanation implies a significant lengthening in the estimated lag on money growth in the St. Louis equation during the 1980s, which has not been confirmed.
Another cyclical explanation not considered explicitly in the text has been suggested by Friedman (1983) , Mascaro and Meltzer (1983) and Tatom (1983a, i983b) ; in their view, an important influence on the demand for money is monetary uncertainty. Suppose that people increase their money holdings relative to their current income when they become more uncertain about their future incomes. If monetary uncertainty increased sufficiently in recent years, this could explain the velocity puzzle, inflation. Thus, when inflation (and presumably inflationarv expectations as welL is declining, the demand for money should rise, and the velocity of money should fall. Since the nominal interest rate can be thought of as composed of the real r'ate plus a pr'emium for the expected rate of inflation, this explanation is closely aligned to the interest sensitivity argument. The principal difference between them is that pr-oponents of the expected-inflation explanation do not argue that the relationship has undergone a structural change." Judd (19831, Tatom i1983a, l983h1 and Friedman (19831 have argued that the decline in velocity in the 1981-83 period can he attributed primanly to disinflation and the associated decline in market interest rates that substantially lowered the opportunity costs of holding money relative to GNP.
In one sense, this explanation is specious or, at the very least, suspicious if extended to velocity movements in more recent yeans. If inflationary expecta-"The expected rate of inflation also could have an independent effect on the demand for money, e.g., m' f (i, "1' where trr is the expected rate of inflation. This issue has not been resolved. 
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tions have fallen over' the past five years, they must have done so for non-monetary reasons; as char-t 2 shows, trend Ml growth has risen rapidly since 1983. These non-monetary factors must have been sufficiently powerful to have swamped the usual influence that rapid trend money growth has on inflation and imeflationary expectations.
Furthermore, if disinflation and declining nominal interest rates caused velocity to decline, then, by the same argument, velocity should have risen shar'ply when inflation accelerated and nominal interest n'ates rose during the 1970s. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Chart 13 shows MI-velocity and the e~post inflation rate. While velocity moves with the inflation rate after 1981, it does not appear to be affected substantially by the inflation rate over the pre-financialinnovations period. Velocity growth during the 1970s is not rapid enough to support this explanation.
Hetzel and Mehra 1l985i suggest that the demand for money balances varies positively with the real value of the dollar in foreign exchange markets. Their' explanation is based on the currency-substitution hypothesis, which states that different currencies are close substitutes for each other. In this explanation, the rise in the real exchange value of the dollar during the early 1980s made holding dollars relatively more attractive, increasing the demand for money relative to income and reducing velocity." Since the real exchange value of the dollar has generally moved with changes in the U.S. inflation rate, this argument is closely related to the inflation am'gument.
This explanation is examined in chart 14, which shows the movements in velocity and the nominal trade-weighted exchange rate since 1973. The nominal rather than the real exchange rate is used for two reasons. First, movements in the nominal exchange rate are more appropriate in assessing the relative returns on two different monies. Second, movements in the nominal and real trade-weighted exchange rates have been highly correlated since 1973. Thus, the "This argument does not seem firmly based in either the transactions or asset approaches to the demand for money. Except for some border situations, there is very limited substitutability between two currencies for transactions purposes. On the other hand, money balances, even interest-bearing checking accounts, are dominated on a risk-adjusted return criterion by other non-money assets. Consequently, it is unlikely that foreign money is held as an asset in portfolios.
Chart 5
Velocities of GNP/M~Aand Permanent Income/M1A general pattern of exchange rate movements is the same whether the nominal or real exchange rate is used.
Chart 14 shows that the exchange rate explanation does not provide a satisfactory answer to the velocity puzzle. From 1973 to 1981, exchange rate movements appear to have no influence on velocity. While velocity did decline from 1981 to 1983, when the exchange rate was rising, it also fell sharply in 1985 and 1986 when the exchange rate was plummeting. 
TWO EXPLANATIONS MAY BE BE1TER THAN ONE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article reviews a number of suggested explanations of the puzzling downturn in Ml velocity during If there are several influences at work, financial innovations and cyclical variations in measured income seem to be among the best candidates. This combination works well in explaining the velocity puzzle through the first quarter-of 1986. when combined with cyclical variation in velocity induced by rapid money growth, it may explain the behavior of velocity through last year. Another explanation that deserves further scrutiny is the possible increased interest sensitivity of Ml balances as a result of monetary innovations during the 1980s.
